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CHAPTER 15 COMPENSATION CONSULTANTS AND 
EXECUTIVE PAY 
MARTIN J. CONYON 
Professor, ESSEC Business School 
 
ABSTRACT 
This chapter provides a review of the recent literature on compensation 
consultants and executive pay. Six major pay consulting firms dominate the market. 
These firms advise client firms about executive pay and frequently supply other services 
such as actuarial work. There is some evidence that CEO pay is higher in firms that use 
compensation consultants. However, the hypothesis that CEO pay is higher in firms 
whose consultants face potential conflicts of interest, such as cross-selling of other 
services, is not as empirically robust.  
 
INTRODUCTION 
Compensation consultants are firms or individuals who advise client 
organizations about executive pay practices (Bebchuk and Fried, 2006; Conyon, Peck, 
and Sadler, 2009a). Critics contend that consultants lead to excessive CEO pay and 
poorly designed contracts. As Crystal (1991, p. 9) notes, “Executive compensation in the 
United States did not go out of control simply through some random process; it went out 
of control because of the actions—or inactions—of a number of parties. The first culprits 
in what will be a litany of culprits are compensation consultants.” An alternative 
perspective is that compensation consultants are experts who provide valuable 
information and data to busy boards of directors. Their presence ameliorates 
opportunistic behavior by chief executive officers (CEOs) and leads to well-structured 
optimal compensation contracts (Conyon et al., 2009a). Do pay consultants promote the 
best interests of the firm’s owners or do they simply enrich entrenched CEOs? 
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This chapter has two objectives. First, it reviews whether compensation 
consultants enhance or encumber the effective governance of CEO pay in light of recent 
studies in the field.  Second, the chapter provides new evidence on the association 
between CEO pay and consultants in a sample of publicly-held firms in the United 
Kingdom. 
CEOs in the United States can earn large sums of money (Conyon, Core, and 
Guay, 2009; Conyon and Murphy 2000; Fernandes, Ferreira, Matos, and Murphy, 2009). 
CEO pay in S&P 500 firms has increased substantially from about $3 million in 1993 to a 
peak of about $16 million in 2000. While it has fallen back in recent years, CEO pay in 
2006 still stood at more than $8 million (Kaplan, 2008). Comparisons with other 
employees are also important to consider. Kaplan documents that American CEOs earn 
significantly more than the typical American household. As Kaplan notes, average total 
pay of CEOs in 1993 was just under 100 times greater than median household income; 
by 2006, it was more than 200 times greater.  
This high level of CEO pay is controversial and a common topic of media 
coverage. This is not surprising when set against the perceived lack of pay-for-
performance, growing income disparities, the economic crisis, and putative declining 
ethical standards in company boardrooms. Some academics have been especially 
critical of executive pay, questioning whether current arrangements are consistent with 
shareholder interests (Bebchuk and Fried, 2003, 2004, 2006). Bebchuk and Fried (2004) 
provide an in-depth review of the problems surrounding CEO pay practices. However, 
not all academics are so critical of CEO compensation. Kaplan (2008), for example, 
provides a robust defense of CEO pay practices in the United States. He argues that 
CEO pay is tied to performance, and that boards are appropriately setting pay, and that 
CEOs are subject to market forces. Other studies have also examined whether the 
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market power or efficient contracting approach is a more appropriate explanation for 
patterns of CEO pay (Core, Guay, and Thomas, 2005; Conyon et al., 2009).   
Until recently, the role of executive compensation consultants has been largely 
unexamined. These consultants often advise busy boards and compensation 
committees on the design of executive pay packages. As with CEO pay, consultants are 
controversial (Crystal, 1991; Bebchuk and Fried, 2003, 2006, 2004; Waxman, 2007;). 
Critics argue that consultants are responsible for high levels of CEO pay and their poorly 
designed compensation packages that include too many perks, hidden benefits such as 
golden parachutes or lucrative pension deals, and non-demanding performance criteria. 
Especially salient is the hypothesis that consultants are not sufficiently independent. 
Consultants suffer from conflicts of interest because they sell other services to their 
clients and are thus wary of provoking the CEO for fear of jeopardizing this other 
business (Bebchuk and Fried, 2004; Waxman, 2007). 
This study contributes to a nascent literature on pay consultants. The remainder 
of the chapter has four sections. The first section discusses compensation consultants 
including disclosure rules, the role of consultants, and consultant independence. This 
section is followed by a review of existing studies. New empirical evidence on CEO pay 




Disclosure of information about executive compensation consultants is now 
required in the United States, the United Kingdom, and Canada. Each country stipulating 
disclosure requires firms to identify the pay consultant by name, but regulations in each 
dominion are nuanced so that information disclosure is appreciably different. For 
example, U.K. firms disclose whether the consultant engages in other non-compensation 
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consulting business activities such as actuarial services with the client firm. This is not 
mandated in the U.S. but companies may voluntarily reveal this information. In Canada, 
firms sometimes separately reveal fee income paid to consultants for executive 
compensation services and non-executive pay business. In the United States and the 
United Kingdom, this rarely happens, if at all. 
Disclosure of compensation consultant information in the United States has been 
mandated since 2007 (SEC 2007). New rules came into effect for companies filing with 
the SEC after December 2006. Item 407(e) of the new regulations requires firms both to 
identify the consultants and to disclose any role of compensation consultants in 
determining or recommending the amount or form of executive and director 
compensation. Disclosure happened earlier in the United Kingdom. The Directors’ 
Remuneration Report Regulations of 2002 mandated firms to disclose consultant 
information in the U.K. for accounting periods after December 2002 (DRR 2002). The 
firms must name any person who provided material advice or services to the 
compensation committee and must disclose whether services in addition to 
compensation advice were given (Bender, 2008; Conyon, Peck, and Sandler, 2009a; 
Kabir and Minhat, 2009). Disclosure in Canada has been required since 2005. On April 
15, 2005, the Canadian Securities Administrators (CSA) issued National Instrument 58-
101, which requires corporations to disclose whether a compensation consultant has 
been used (Canada, 2005). Together, the United States, the United Kingdom, and 
Canada report sufficient information about compensation consultants to investigate their 
effect on CEO pay. 
 
The Market for Executive Compensation Consulting Services 
The market for executive compensation consulting services is an oligopoly: a few 
prominent compensation consultants supply a range of services to a large number of 
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client firms. Panel A of Table 15.1 illustrates the basic market structure for the United 
States, the United Kingdom, and Canada. The ‘big six’ consulting firms in the U.S. are 
Towers Perrin, Mercer Human Resource Consulting, Frederick W. Cook & Co., Hewitt 
Associates, Watson Wyatt Worldwide, and Pearl Meyer and Partners. Various studies 
document evidence of the dominance of the big six (Bebchuk and Fried, 2004; Waxman 
2007; Armstrong, Ittner, and Larcker, 2008; Cadman, Carter, and Hillegeist 2009; 
Conyon et al., 2009a; Murphy and Sandino 2009). These major consulting firms are also 
prevalent in the United Kingdom.(Bender, 2008; Conyon et al., 2009a; Conyon, Peck, 
and Sadler, 2009b; Kabir and Minhat, 2009; Voulgaris, Stathopoulos, and Walker, 2009) 
as well as in Canada (Murphy and Sandio, 2009). In addition, New Bridge Street 
Consultants and Monks Partnership are also important players in the U.K. market. 
The following broad features of the market are noteworthy (see Table 15.1). First, 
there are six main firms consulting on executive compensation. The frequency 
distribution of client market shares is right skewed such that the big six capture most 
clients but there is a long tail of other consulting firms. Second, consulting firms are 
ubiquitous. Most large publicly-traded firms use them and only a few do not. Third, pay 
consultants often supply additional services other than pay advice to client firms. These 
other services can include actuarial or benefits advice. These other services have been 
used to measure whether the consultant has a potential conflict of interest with the client 
firm. 
(Insert Table 15.1 about here) 
 
Why Do Firms Use Pay Consultants? 
Compensation consultants are firms or individuals who provide client 
organizations with advice and information about executive pay. Why do firms use pay 
consultants? Compensation consultants can form part of an optimal governance 
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structure by providing information, which can reduce agency costs and help boards 
arrive at the best compensation contract to offer the CEO on the behalf of shareholders. 
Consultants provide expert advice, salient information, data and valuable analysis ( 
Baker, Jensen, and Murphy, 1988; Bebchuk and Fried, 2004; Conyon et al., 2009a; 
Murphy and Sandino, 2009). They are experts in helping boards and compensation 
committees understand the value of complex pay packages and associated tax, 
disclosure, and accounting issues. In this scenario, consultants are not controversial. 
Their use is warranted and defensible because consultants represent a low-cost 
(economic) solution for generating the optimal compensation contract and reducing 
moral hazard. Problems arise, as discussed next, if consultants are not independent or 
suffer from conflicts of interests. 
 
Are Pay Consultants Independent? 
Critics often contend that pay consultants face significant conflicts of interests 
that impede their impartiality and independence (Crystal, 1991; Bebchuk and Fried,  
2003, 2006). Critics argue that executive compensation contracts will be sub-optimal and 
favor the CEOs interests at the expense of the owner/shareholders. Three issues 
potentially compromise the consultant’s independence and create a conflict of interest. 
 
Psychological Bias 
In practice, the company and not the shareholders hires the consultant. 
Consequently, the consultant may psychologically favor managements’ interests at the 
expense of shareholders’ interests. This bias might be inadvertent or strategic. A 
consultant hired by the firm (or CEO) may feel psychologically obligated to the CEO 
(Bebchuk and Fried,  2004; Core et al., 2005; Murphy and Sandino, 2009). A type of gift 
exchange has occurred. The consultant having received a lucrative assignment by the 
client firm may reciprocate by recommending generous pay for the CEO. When 
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management does the hiring, the consultant’s incentives may be skewed in favor of the 
CEO’s interests rather than those of the shareholders. 
 
Repeat Business 
The prospect that the consultant’s assignment may be terminated or not renewed 
may also distort incentives (Bebchuk and Fried, 2004; Conyon et al., 2009a). This has 
been referred to as the ‘repeat business’ hypothesis (Murphy and Sandino, 2009). If the 
consultant recommends low CEO pay, then the probability of being terminated 
increases. In addition, the likelihood of getting business from other clients may also 
diminish (Bebchuk and Fried, 2004). Consultants who fear being fired and losing repeat 
business are more likely to recommend pay contracts that favor the CEO at the expense 
of shareholders.  
 
Cross-selling of Other Services 
 Compensation consultants often provide services in addition to advice about 
executive compensation (Armstrong et al., 2008; Cadman, Carter, and Hillegeisst, 2009; 
Conyon et al., 2009a; Murphy and Sandino, 2009). Such advice may involve actuarial 
assignments, benefits, accounting, and general management. Selling other services in 
addition to compensation advice potentially distorts the incentives. These additional 
services make consultants unwilling to attack a CEO’s pay package for fear of putting 
this other business at risk. The extant literature hypothesizes that CEO pay is higher in 
client firms if the consultant provides business services other than executive 
compensation advice (Cadman et al., 2009; Conyon et al., 2009a; Murphy and Sandino, 
2009). As noted in Table 15.1, the cross-selling of other services is a relatively common 
practice in the United States and the United Kingdom. 
In summary, compensation consultants may be conflicted for the following 
reasons: (1) the psychological pressures that bond them more closely to management 
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(e.g., reciprocation and gift-exchange); (2) the fear of losing future or repeat business; 
and (3) the presence of other lucrative business opportunities. The result is that 
potentially conflicted consultants offer advice in favor of management rather than 
shareholders. One brake on opportunistic consultant behavior is the consultants desire 
to maintain a high-quality reputation. A consultant exposed for colluding with 
management or recommending lucrative pay deals for poor performance will suffer a 
loss of reputation or risk termination by the client firm’s board of directors. Maintaining 
and developing a good market reputation is therefore important for the consultant and 
ameliorates the tendency for consultants to side with management over shareholders. 
The effect of maintaining a good reputation works against finding a positive correlation 
between CEO pay and conflicted consultants. 
 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
Several recent research papers on pay consultants have emerged. The broad 
hypothesis tested in these papers is that compensation consultants are associated with 
higher CEO pay at client firms. These new studies generally use multivariate regression 
methods. The overall goal has been to determine whether pay consultants are operating 
in the best interests of shareholders or err on the side of management. Current evidence 
comes from three countries where disclosure rules permit data collection: the United 
States, the United Kingdom, and Canada. These are English Legal Origin countries (La 
Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer, 2008). 
The emerging literature uses data from different countries. Two studies adopt a 
comparative methodology: Conyon et al. (2009a) focus on the United States and the 
United Kingdom while Murphy and Sandino (2009) study the United States and Canada. 
Other papers focus on single countries such as the United States (Armstrong et al., 
2008; Cadman et al., 2009) or the United Kingdom (Bender, 2008; Conyon et al., 2009b; 
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Kabir and Minhat, 2009; Voulgaris et al., 2009). Still other papers have remarked on 
compensation consultants, although this has not been the primary focus of the research 
design (Tosi and Gomez-Mejia, 1989; Wade, Porac, and Pollok, 1997; Bizjak, Lemmon, 
and Naveen, 2007; Faulkender and Yang, 2008). Central to this new literature is how to 
measure the variable ‘consultant.’ Researchers have used many different measures, 
thus making direct comparisons across studies difficult. For example, studies have used 
an indicator variable (1 = yes, 0 = no) for the presence of a compensation consultant 
(Armstrong et al., 2008; Conyon et al., 2009a, 2009b; Kabir and Minhat, 2009; Voulgaris 
et al., 2009), the market share of the consultants (Kabir and Minhat, 2009), proxies for 
conflicts of interest in the cross-selling of other services (Cadman et al., 2009; Conyon et 
al. 2009a, 2009b; Murphy and Sandino, 2009), the ratio of fee income from additional 
non-compensation services divided by fees from executive pay advice (Murphy and 
Sandino, 2009), and various indicator variables for individual specific consultants 
(Armstrong et al., 2008; Kabir and Minhat, 2009). 
 
Multi-country Studies 
Conyon et al. (2009a) investigate the relation between CEO pay and 
compensation consultants in the United States and the United Kingdom. In the research 
design, they consider the two countries separately rather than pooling them into the 
same sample. Their econometric models use a sample of 308 U.S. firms from the 
S&P500 in 2006 and 229 large U.K. firms in 2003. The sample size is small relative to 
other emerging studies in this field. The authors use ordinary least squares (OLS) 
methods on cross-section data. They measure CEO pay in a manner consistent with the 
extant executive compensation literature (Murphy, 1999). The authors broadly calculate 
CEO compensation as the sum of salary, bonus, benefits, stock options, restricted stock, 
and other compensation. This measure reflects the expected cost to shareholders of 
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granting equity and stock options. Granted stock options are valued using the Black 
Scholes model where the price of a European call option on a dividend paying stock is c 
= Se-qtN(d1) – Xe-rtN(d2), where d1 = (ln(S/X) + (r-q+σ2/2)t) / σ√t, d2 = d1 - σ√t, and S is 
the stock price; X the exercise price; t the maturity term; r the risk-free interest rate; q the 
dividend yield and σ the volatility of returns. N(.) is the cumulative probability distribution 
function for a standardized normal variable (Black and Scholes, 1973). The source of the 
U.S. pay data is the ExecuComp database and data for the U.K. firms is hand-collected 
from annual reports and accounts. 
Conyon et al. (2009a) find the level of CEO pay is positively correlated with the 
presence of consultants (defined as 0-1 binary variable) in both the United States and 
the United Kingdom. They also find that the mix of CEO pay, defined as the fraction of 
equity pay in total CEO compensation, is positively correlated to consultants. The latter 
suggests that consultants provide client CEOs with greater pay-at-risk, an outcome that 
is presumably in shareholder interests as it represents greater pay-for-performance. The 
results have implications for the  interpretation of the positive association between the 
level of CEO pay and consultants. Risk-averse CEOs whose contracts contain more 
risky pay (for example, more stock options or other equity pay) will need to be 
compensated with greater expected levels of pay (Conyon et al., 2009; Fernandes et al., 
2009). The findings imply that the higher levels of CEO pay associated with the 
presence of consultants may well be part of an efficient contract and not due to upward 
pay pressures promulgated by conflicted consultants. Further evidence in favor of this 
interpretation is the fact that the authors can measure directly conflicted consultants by 
an indicator variable of whether the consultant also supplies other business to the client 
firm. The variable is insignificant in their estimated OLS models. 
Conyon et al. (2009a) also investigate whether CEO pay is related to potentially 
conflicted consultants. This is measured as a binary variable (= 1) if the consultant 
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supplies other services to the firm. Firms are mandated to reveal this information in the 
report and accounts in the United Kingdom but not in the United States. Instead, for the 
United States, the authors use a dummy variable (= 1) if the firm uses consulting firm 
Pearl Meyer or Frederick W. Cook. This follows a strategy advocated by Cadman et al. 
(2009). Pearl Meyer and Frederick C. Cook do not provide other non-compensation 
services to clients and thus are less prone (relative to other consulting firms) to be 
potentially conflicted. Conyon et al. find no statistical relation between CEO pay in firms 
whose clients also supply other business. 
Murphy and Sandino (2009) investigate the relation between CEO compensation 
and consultants in the United States and Canada. They focus explicitly on potentially 
conflicted consultants, rather than just the presence of a consultant. Murphy and 
Sandino (p. 30) find “marginally significant evidence in the U.S. that CEO pay is higher in 
firms where the consultants provide other services and that pay increases with the 
number of other services provided. Empirical analyses using data from Canada suggest 
that CEO pay is higher when the consultant provides other services, especially actuarial 
or benefits-administration services.” 
Murphy and Sandino (2009) use a snapshot of U.S. data on 1,341 S&P 500, S&P 
MidCap 400, and SmallCap 600 firms. The sample is larger than that used by Conyon et 
al., (2009a) who focus instead on constituents of the S&P 500. Murphy and Sandino 
measure the potential conflict of interests faced by the compensation consultant in a two 
ways: whether the consultant offers a defined-benefit (DB) plan; or whether the 
consultant is also the actuary for the client firm. Using these measures, no statistical 
evidence exists of a positive correlation between potentially conflicted compensation 
consultants and CEO pay.  Murphy and Sandino (p. 20) also investigate CEO pay in 
firms “whose compensation consultant provides other services to the company beyond 
(or in addition to) actuarial services, based on voluntary and self-reported disclosures by 
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companies.” In the United Kingdom, legal rules mandate this disclosure (DRR, 2002) but 
in the United States, the information is voluntary. Importantly, the authors find a 
significantly positive correlation between CEO pay and the variable “consultant provides 
other services.”  
 Murphy and Sandino (2009) also test the relation between CEO pay and 
potentially conflicted compensation consultants using data on 120 Canadian firms. They 
find that CEO pay is higher in firms whose consultants supply other business to the firm. 
Especially important is the explanatory variable “fee ratio,” defined as the fees paid for 
non-executive-compensation services divided by the fees paid for executive 
compensation services. The fee ratio variable arguably captures the degree of incentive 
distortion that a consultant faces. If zero, the consultant cares only about compensation 
consulting fee incomes. The greater the ratio, the more the consultant cares about non-
compensation service fees. The coefficient on the “fee ratio” variable is positive and 
significant in the regression models. However, the authors note that outliers may drive 
this result because once they remove some extreme observations from their data, the 
significance of the finding erodes considerably. However, in principle the fee-ratio seems 
to be a good measure of the temptation faced by consultants to side with management. 
As yet, this ratio is generally unavailable to researchers in the United States or the 
United Kingdom. 
 
Single Country Studies 
 Cadman et al. (2009) investigate whether U.S. compensation consultants’ 
potential cross-selling incentives are positively correlated with CEO pay in client firms. 
Specifically, they investigate 755 firms from the U.S. S&P 1500 for 2006. The sampling 
frame is akin to Murphy and Sandino (2009) and larger than that of Conyon et al. 
(2009a). Cadman et al. (p. 1) are “unable to find widespread evidence of higher levels of 
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pay or lower pay-performance sensitivities for clients of consultants with potentially 
greater conflicts of interest. Overall, [they] do not find evidence suggesting that potential 
conflicts of interest between the firm and its consultant are a primary driver of excessive 
CEO pay.” This finding is in accord with the results contained in Conyon et al. for the 
United States and the weakly significant U.S. results in Murphy and Sandino. 
As with other U.S. studies, Cadman et al. (2009) find that consultants are 
ubiquitous (only about 14 percent of firms do not retain a consultant). Cadman et al. (p. 
2) define potentially conflicted consultants as: “(1) client firms who affirmatively disclose 
that their compensation consultant provides non-EC services; (2) firms that are not 
clients of Frederic W. Cook or Pearl Meyer, large consultants that focus exclusively on 
executive compensation services and thus do not have cross-selling incentives; and (3) 
firms that hire their auditor for significant non-audit services, indicating a willingness to 
allow possible conflicts of interest among their professional service providers.” There is 
little evidence that CEO pay is correlated with these different measures of conflict of 
interest. An important feature of the study is the recognition that the selection of the 
consultant is endogenous. The authors estimated a two-stage least squares (2SLS) 
regression, but the main results of the effect of consultants on CEO pay remained 
qualitatively unaltered. 
Armstrong et al. (2008) investigate the relation between CEO pay and the use of 
compensation consultants in a sample of 2,116 U.S. firms in fiscal year 2006. The firms 
are effectively the constituents of the Russell 3000 and this sample is substantially larger 
than other U.S. studies. The authors define a binary variable (1 = yes, 0 = no) where the 
firm uses a compensation consultant for strategic compensation advice as opposed to 
no consultant or simple pay benchmarking. 
Armstrong et al. (2008, p.1) find that “CEO pay is generally higher in clients of 
most consulting firms, even after controlling for economic determinants of 
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compensation.” About 87 percent of participants in their sample uses pay-consultants. 
An important feature of their analysis is the propensity score matching methodology. 
This permits the authors to create statistically equivalent distributions for the users of 
consultants (the treatment group) and non-users of consultants (the control group) 
based on a broad set of covariates (except CEO pay). This approach is compelling 
because it helps correct for the endogenous nature of the treatment variable in non-
random data. In the empirical results, Armstrong et al. (p.1) find that when “users and 
non-users are matched on both economic and governance characteristics, differences in 
pay levels are not statistically significant. These results are consistent with claims that 
compensation consultants provide a mechanism for CEOs of companies with weak 
governance to extract and justify excess pay.” The authors investigate CEO pay in client 
firms across the different consultants. As with Cadman et al. (2009), Armstrong et al. find 
little support for the hypothesis that CEO pay is higher in firms using “conflicted” 
consultants who also offer additional non-compensation related services (i.e., are not 
Pearl Meyer or Frederick W. Cook). 
For U.K. firms, Kabir and Minhat (2009) and Minhat (2009) investigate the effect 
of pay consultants on executive pay using a sample of 175 companies for the period 
2003-2006 (700 firm-year observations). Kabir and Minhat (p. 1) find “no support for the 
hypothesis that CEO pay is higher when firms employ multiple compensation 
consultants. Instead, [their] results show that the market share of compensation 
consultants is significantly related to CEO compensation.” The authors interpret their 
finding as consistent with the idea that consultants do not want to lose business with 
client firms.  
In Kabir and Minhat (2009), the primary measure of compensation consultant 
influence is the count of the number of consultants used by a firm. They measure 
executive compensation as total pay. Using OLS and panel data (random effects) 
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methods, the authors find no statistical relation between CEO pay and the number of 
consultants used. On the other hand, a statistically positive correlation exists between 
CEO pay and the firm’s market share. The panel data methodology used in the study is 
attractive because such data methods attenuate persistent firm effects, capturing them 
in the error structure of the estimating equation. However, the study does not attempt to 
control for potentially conflicted consultants by investigating whether the CEO hired them 
or if the consultants provide any other non-compensation services. 
Voulgaris et al. (2009) investigate the relation between CEO pay and 
compensation consultants in a cross section of 2006 data. The sample consists of 500 
U.K. firms from the FTSE 100, 250, and Small Cap indices. Similar to other studies, the 
authors measure CEO pay as the sum of salaries, bonuses, long-term incentives, and 
stock option grants, where stock options are valued using the Black-Scholes method. 
Overall, they find that 134 firms (about 27 percent) do not have consultants, but larger 
and more complex firms are more likely to use consultants than smaller ones. Conyon et 
al. (2009b) also find a positive correlation between use of consultants and firm size in  a 
regression model. 
Voulgaris et al. (2009) find a positive correlation between CEO pay and the 
presence of a compensation consultant, which is consistent with the hypothesis that 
consultants raise pay. However, they also find that the ratio of equity pay to total pay is 
higher in firms using consultants and the ratio of salary to total pay is lower. This finding 
suggests that consultants not only raise the level of pay but also design contracts that 
contain more risk (equity pay) and less insurance (salary pay), consistent with 
shareholder goals. This result is consistent with Conyon et al. (2009a) who find a 
positive correlation between the equity pay mix and consultants in U.S. and U.K. firms. 
Another attractive feature of the Voulgaris et al. study is that it controls for the 
endogenous nature of the pay consultants. They re-estimate their CEO pay models 
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using 2SLS where the first stage is a probit selection model on the use of consultants. 
Importantly, they find that CEO pay is still greater, the salary pay mix is lower, and the 
equity pay mix higher in firms using a consultant. . 
Conyon et al. (2009b) investigate the relation between CEO pay and consultants 
in a set of 232 large U.K. firms in 2003. The authors discover a positive correlation 
between CEO pay and conflicted compensation consultants, measured as the consulting 
firm selling other business to the client firm. The result is marginally significant. In 
addition, they find that CEO pay is positively correlated with CEO pay in peer firms who 
used the same consultant as the focal firm. They also find the level of CEO 
compensation in the focal firm is positively related to the number of board interlocks 
created by both a shared director and a shared compensation consultant. As with 
Voulgaris et al. (2009) in the United Kingdom and Cadman et al. (2009) in the United 
States, Conyon et al. also model the selection of the compensation consultant. They find 
that firm size is a significant predictor variable of using a compensation consultant. 
Bender (2008) provides a qualitative account of compensation consultants in the 
United Kingdom rather than using quantitative methods. She analyzes 12 (anonymous) 
companies from the U.K. FTSE 350 covering 40 individual and group interviews between 
2001 and 2003. The author interviews CEOs, remuneration committee chairs, and five 
consultants advising those companies. Although firms choose consultants for their 
expertise, Bender (p.11) finds that “There was no common thread to how the consultants 
had been engaged, other than the fact that the consultants’ reputation was very 
important, and personal recommendations, for example from a board member who had 
worked with them before, were an advantage.” Bender (p. 23) also reports that pay 
consultants themselves do recognize the potential for conflicts of interest: “… yes you 
[the consultants] do come across difficulties between the execs who have appointed you 
or the remuneration committee who have appointed you. And that’s when you’ve got to 
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know who appointed you. Because at the end of the day if there is a conflict, you’ve got 
to go back to the people who appointed you and say look I cannot advise both of you.” 
However, it seems apparent that all parties (i.e. consultants and firms) tend to recognize 
this conflict and take steps to ameliorate it so as not to harm owner interests. In a similar 
vein, Murphy and Sandino (2009) report that pay consulting firms address their internal 
governance structures to avoid conflicts of interest by building formal divisions between 
different parts of the overall business. 
 
Related Studies 
Related studies have also remarked on the importance compensation 
consultants (Baker et al., 1988). An early study by Tosi and Gomez-Mejia (1989) find 
that consultants are important for determining CEO pay. They base their analysis on 
survey data. Wade et al. (1997) theorize that companies use consultants to justify and 
legitimize executive pay practices. They find that firms who pay their CEOs high salaries 
are more likely to explain this by reference to a compensation consultant in proxy 
statements. Faulkender and Yang (2008) study how peer group comparisons affect CEO 
pay. They find evidence that consultants can influence the choice of peer firms used in 
the benchmarking of CEO pay.  
 
CONSULTANTS AND CEO PAY: U.K. EVIDENCE 
This section provides new evidence on the relation between CEO pay and 
compensation consultants using U.K. data found in (Conyon et al., (2009a). The main 
results are based on OLS estimates. Using insights from the prior literature, the author 
estimates the relation between CEO pay and the compensation consultant by estimating 
a fairly standard CEO pay equation. Table 15.2 contains the results. Columns 1 to 3 are 
based on measuring consultant use (1 = yes, 0 = no). Columns 3 to 6 are conditional on 
the firm using at least one consultant. These columns measure ‘conflicted’ compensation 
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consultants as either the consultant supplying other business to the client firm (1 = yes, 
0 = no) or whether the compensation committee appoints the compensation consultant 
(1 = yes, 0 = no. This an inverse measure of conflict).  
 CEO compensation is calculated as the sum of salary, bonus, benefits, stock 
options (using the Black-Scholes formula), restricted stock, and other compensation. 
The regression models contain economic and human capital control variables including 
the size of the firm (the log of firm sales), reflecting the returns to organizational 
complexity (Core, Holthausen, and Larcker, 1999; Murphy, 1985, 1999). The model 
includes company performance, reflecting the potential alignment of owner and manager 
interests (Core et al., 1999; Murphy, 1985, 1999) measured as total returns to 
shareholders (share price appreciation plus dividends). The book-to-market ratio is 
included as an (inverse) measure of growth opportunities within the firm (Core et al., 
1999). The model contains a measure of stock volatility, measured as the standard 
deviation of annualized monthly stock returns over the prior calendar year to capture the 
idea that risk-averse executives require greater compensation in more risky corporate 
environments. The model includes human capital variables CEO tenure and CEO age to 
reflect the CEO’s skill and experience. Finally, a set of industry indicator variables is 
included as controls for inter-industry variation in the demand for executive talent (Core 
et al., 1999). 
  Columns 1 to 3 demonstrate a positive correlation between CEO total pay 
(including bonuses and options) and the use of consultants. CEO salary is also positively 
correlated with the presence of a consultant. In addition, CEO equity pay mix (the 
amount of options and other equity expressed as a fraction of total pay) is greater in 
firms that use consultants. These results control for other economic determinants such 
as growth opportunities (book-to-market ratio), firm performance (shareholder returns), 
firm risk (stock price volatility), and demographic characteristics (CEO job tenure and 
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age), and are in agreement with other work (Conyon et al., 2009a; Voulgaris et al., 
2009). The coefficient estimates are all significant. Adjusted standard errors are reported 
based on clustering on the consulting firm because different consulting firms may offer 
different pay strategies and advice. For example, column 1 suggests that total CEO pay 
is approximately 26 percent higher in firms using consultants (calculated as e0.23 -1). 
Similarly, CEO equity pay mix is about 14 percent higher in such firms. In columns 3 to 
6, there is marginal evidence that CEO pay is higher in firms whose consultants supply 
other business. CEO salary is estimated to be about 7 percent higher in such firms 
(conditional on having hired a consultant). Although the coefficient estimates of the 
consultant effect on total CEO pay and the equity pay mix are positive, they are not 
significant. However, the insignificance may be due to the small sample size so the sign 
of the coefficient is of interest. 
(Insert Table 15.2 about here) 
 One issue to note when interpreting such results is how the disclosure of 
information about consultants affected the dynamic estimation between CEO pay and 
measures of (conflicted) consultants. Typically, researchers estimate reduced form 
econometric models using observed data rather than the underlying (true) parameters 
from a theoretical or structural equation. These estimates of the CEO pay and consultant 
relation could possibly have changed when the disclosure policy changed. For example, 
in the pre-disclosure period, there might have been a positive correlation between CEO 
pay and consultants but the data was not publicly observable to the econometrician. 
However, when the policy changed, so that more information was disclosed, this may 
have modified agent behavior. For example, the previously conflicted pay consultants 
decided no longer to recommend lavish CEO pay. In consequence, the relation between 
CEO pay and consultant altered. This suggests that policy decisions based on reduced-
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form models could be misleading. These type of policy issues are discussed by Lucas 
(1976). 
 In addition to the OLS results contained in Table 15.2, the author also carried out 
some sensitivity analysis using propensity score matching methods to investigate the 
relation between CEO pay and consultants (as in Armstrong et al., 2008). In principle, 
propensity score matching can alleviate selection biases arising from the non-random 
assignment of data (Rosenbaum and Rubin 1983; Heckman, Ichimura, and Todd, 1997, 
1998; Rubin 2006). Propensity score does so by optimally matching firms that use 
consultants (the treatment condition) to firms that do not use consultants (the control 
condition). Using a nearest neighbor algorithm (Leuven and Sianesi 2003), a matched 
sample of firms was constructed between firms that use consultants (treatment) and 
those firms not using consultants (control). The results indicated that CEO pay in firms 
using consultants is no different from firms not using consultants. In addition, CEO pay 
was not higher in firms using potentially conflicted consultants (i.e., those firms where 
the consultant supplied other business) compared to client firms using independent 
consultants. This illustrates that studies based on OLS methods alone might result in 
false inference if the characteristics of the two distributions (consultant versus no-
consultant) are different. Propensity score methods can help considerably when using 
such non-experimental data (Armstrong et al., 2008). 
 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
Changes in disclosure rules in the United States, the United Kingdom, and 
Canada have led to more available information about pay consultants for investors and 
researchers (Waxnan, 2007;Armstrong et al., 2008; Cadman et al., 2009; Conyon et al. 
2009a; Murphy and Sandino, 2009). However, nuances exist in the information reported 
across countries. For example, in the U.S., firms reveal the name of the consultant. In 
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the U.K., firms are also mandated to reveal whether the consultant supplies any other 
business. In Canada, although not mandated, firms may reveal fee incomes from non-
compensation services as well as fees received from executive pay advice. Such 
enhanced disclosure provides traction on whether the consultant is subject to a potential 
conflict of interest. Overall, there is much more available information about pay 
consultants today than ten years ago, but more low-cost transparency might be 
welcome. 
 A review of the existing evidence shows mixed findings of the effects of 
consultants on CEO pay. In general, there is a positive correlation between the level of 
CEO pay and the presence of consultants: firms that use consultants pay their CEOs 
more. Interpreting this result is problematic not least because CEOs of firms using 
consultants may have more pay at risk in the form of options or restricted stock. If so, 
higher levels of CEO pay in firms using consultants might simply reflect a risk-premium 
rather than a failure of compensation consultants to recommend contracts that are in the 
best interests of shareholders. It is therefore difficult to interpret a positive correlation 
between CEO pay and the presence of a consultant as being necessarily bad for 
owners’ interests. 
 A better approach is to measure directly whether the consultant has a potential 
conflict of interest, for example by selling other services to the client firm or receiving 
high level of fees for such services relative to income from executive pay advice. Many 
studies use this strategy including Cadman et al. (2009), Conyon et al. (2009a, 2009b), 
and Murphy and Sandino (2009). The current evidence has produced mixed evidence in 
support of the hypothesis that conflicted consultants lead to higher CEO pay. Murphy 
and Sandino find some evidence that conflicted consultants are associated with higher 
CEO pay in client firms in the U.S. For Canada, they find stronger evidence that CEO 
compensation is higher in firms with conflicted consultants, especially for actuarial and 
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benefits administration services. Conyon et al. (2009a) and Cadman et al. find little 
evidence of a relation between CEO pay and conflicted consultants measured inversely 
by whether the firm uses Frederick W. Cook or Pearl Meyer. In U.K. firms, studies find 
that CEO pay is greater in firms with consultants but weaker evidence that CEO pay is 
higher in firms with conflicted consultants such as cross selling other services (Conyon 
et al., 2009a, 2009b; Kabir and Minhat, 2009; Voulgaris et al., 2009). The existing 
empirical evidence, then, does not universally support the hypothesis that conflicted 
consultants lead to higher CEO pay. 
 In summary, CEO pay is an important tool for aligning management and 
shareholder interests (Murphy,1999). Recently, researchers have hypothesized that pay 
consultants face conflicts of interest that lead to excessive CEO pay and poorly 
structured pay contracts. Studies are emerging to test this claim, but the available 
empirical evidence is not wholly supportive. An expanded set of studies is warranted to 
further test how pay consultants influence executive compensation.  
 
DISCUSSION QUESTIONS 
1. Why do firms use compensation consultants? 
2. What are the main characteristics of the market for executive compensation 
consulting services? 
3. Are compensation consultants sufficiently independent? 
4. Does the current empirical evidence show that consultants lead to excess CEO pay 
and/or poorly designed pay packages? 
5. How should governments and policy makers respond to the fact that compensation 
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Table 15.1 Executive Compensation Consultants 
This table shows the major compensation consultants used by firms in the United States, 
United Kingdom. and Canada. The analysis is based on data from previous studies. 
 
 United States United 
Kingdom 
Canada 
 # % # % # % 
Panel A. Major consultants 
Towers Perrin 95 23.8 68 29.4 45 36 
Mercer Consulting 84 21.0 26 11.3 53 42 
Frederic W. Cook & Co. 77 19.3 n/a n/a 5 4 
Hewitt Associates 66 16.5 13 5.6 9 7 
Watson Wyatt Worldwide 31 7.8 30 13.0 6 5 
Pearl Meyer 22 5.5 n/a n/a n/a n/a 
PricewaterhouseCoopers 
Monks 
n/a n/a 37 16.0 n/a n/a 
New Bridge Street Consultants n/a n/a 62 26.8 n/a n/a 
       
Panel B. Consultant use 
No consultant used 125 14.2c 26 11.2e 41 20.5f 
Two or more consultants used 181 17.0d 95 40.9e n/a n/a 
       
Panel C. Potential conflicts 
Consultant supplies other 
business to client firm 
113 63.1g 106 45.9h 156 46.2i 
Compensation committee 
retains consultant j 
n/a n/a 125 54.2 n/a n/a 
Ratio of fees for other services 
to fees for executive pay 
advice 
n/a 11g n/a n/ah n/a 13.4i 
 
Notes: # = number; % = percentage. 
a Based on Conyon et al. (2009a. p. 49, Table 1) using a sample of 400 U.S. firms and 
231 U.K. firms. 
b Based on Murphy and Sandino (2009, p. 42, Table 8, Panel B) using a sample of 
200 Canadian firms. 
c Based on Cadman et al. (2009. p. 29, Table 1) using a sample of 880 U.S. firms.. 
d Based on Murphy and Sandino (2009, p. 8) using a sample of 1046 U.S. firms. 
e Based on Conyon et al. (2009c, p. 36) using a sample of 232 U.K. firms. 
f  Based on Murphy and Sandino (2009, p. 26) using a sample of 200 Canadian firms. 
g  Based on Waxman (2007) using 2006 data on 179 firms from the Fortune 250 
(information not available publicly). Murphy and Sandino (p. 27) report 11.7 percent. 
h Based on Conyon et al. (2009b) using 231 U.K. firms. 
i  Based on Murphy and Sandino (2009, p. 27-28). 
j This is an inverse measure of potential conflict. 
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Table 15.2 Consultants and CEO Pay: U.K. Regression Results 
 
This table provides OLS estimates of the relation between CEO pay and compensation 
consultants in the United Kingdom. The analysis uses data from large publicly-traded 
firms in the United Kingdom in 2003. 
 



















       
Consultant 0.23** 0.08** 0.13***    
 (0.07) (0.03) (0.02)    
Consultant supplies    0.10 0.07* 0.01 
other business    (0.09) (0.03) (0.03) 
Compensation     0.08 0.05 0.04 
committee appoints 
consultant 
   (0.10) (0.05) (0.02) 
Log sales 0.26*** 0.18*** 0.02 0.24*** 0.18*** 0.02 
 (0.04) (0.01) (0.01) (0.04) (0.02) (0.01) 
Book to market -0.45** -0.27* -0.04 -0.45** -0.30** -0.04 
 (0.13) (0.11) (0.05) (0.13) (0.12) (0.06) 
Shareholder 
returns 
0.00 0.00 -0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.00 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Volatility 0.10 -0.09 0.08 -0.04 -0.15 0.02 
 (0.18) (0.13) (0.07) (0.08) (0.11) (0.06) 
Job tenure -0.00** 0.01* -0.01*** -0.00 0.00 -0.01** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
CEO age 0.00 0.01* -0.00 0.01 0.01** -0.00 
 (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Constant 5.15*** 4.31*** 0.30** 5.25*** 4.28*** 0.44*** 
 (0.22) 
 
(0.26) (0.10) (0.19) (0.28) (0.09) 
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 229 229 229 209 209 209 
R-squared 0.325 0.501 0.138 0.318 0.520 0.088 
 
Notes: The sample consists of 229 U.K. firms in 2003. CEO pay is the sum of salary, 
bonus, Black-Scholes value of stock option grants, restricted stock grants, and other 
pay. Equity pay mix is equity pay (the value of options and restricted stock) divided by 
CEO pay. Consultant is an indicator variable equal to 1 if the firm has a consultant and 0 
otherwise. Consultant supplies other business, and compensation committee appoints 
the consultant are also indicator variables. Consultant supplies other business is an 
indicator variable equal to 1 if consultant provides services other than remuneration 
advice to the focal firm. Log sales is the log of firm sales revenues. Book to market is the 
book value of assets divided by the market value of the company. Shareholder returns 
are stock price appreciation plus dividends over three years. Volatility is the annualized 
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standard deviation in stock prices. Job tenure is executive time in office (years). CEO 
age is the executives’ age (years). Robust standard errors in parentheses: *** p < 0.01, 
** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.  
